Search results
Results From The WOW.Com Content Network
Physical causal closure is a metaphysical theory about the nature of causation in the ... Kim argues that if the strong physical causal closure argument is ...
The first principle, which most ontological physicalists would accept, is the causal closure of the physical domain, according to which, every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause. The second principle Kim notes is that of causal exclusion, which holds that no normal event can have more than one sufficient cause.
Jaegwon Kim has argued against non-reductive physicalism on the grounds that it violates the causal closure of the physical, which assumes that physics provides a full explanation of physical events. If mental properties are causally efficacious, they must either be identical to physical properties or there must be widespread overdetermination.
The principle, in slightly different iterations, has variously been called causal closure, completeness of the physical, physical closure, and physical comprehensiveness. [2] This has been the foremost argument against interactionism in contemporary philosophy. [7]
Causal closure iterating that the physical and mental world cannot interact presents an obvious issue in regard to dualism. In the world of dualism, the mind and body are two entirely separate constituents which continuously interact with each other, in order for the human being to function as a whole.
(1) A centerpiece of Chalmers's argument is the physical world's causal closure. Newton's law of motion explains this phenomenon succinctly: for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. Cause and effect is a symmetrical process. There is no room for consciousness to exert any causal power on the physical world unless it is itself ...
What follows is a summary of the causal exclusion problem in its simplest form, and it is merely one of several possible formulations. To the extent that we do not have to go outside human physiology in order to trace the causal antecedents of any bodily movement, intentional action can be fully causally explained by the existence of these physiological antecedents alone.
Since either M or P is sufficient for M* or P*, the problem of mental-physical causal overdetermination is the causal redundancy. Whereas there may unproblematically be recognised many different necessary conditions of the event's occurrence, no two distinct events may lay claim to be sufficient conditions, since this would lead to ...