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Hence first degree price discrimination can eliminate deadweight loss that occurs in monopolistic markets. [22] Examples of first degree price discrimination can be observed in markets where consumers bid for tenders, though, in this case, the practice of collusive tendering could reduce the market efficiency. [31]
Second-degree price discrimination The business uses volume discounts which allow buyers to purchase a higher inventory at a reduced price. While this benefits the high-inventory buyer, it obviously hurts the low-inventory buyer who is forced to pay a higher price. This buyer may then be less competitive in the downstream market.
The Robinson–Patman Act (RPA) of 1936 (or Anti-Price Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13)) is a United States federal law that prohibits anticompetitive practices by producers, specifically price discrimination.
The three basic forms of price discrimination are first, second and third degree price discrimination. In first degree price discrimination the company charges the maximum price each customer is willing to pay. The maximum price a consumer is willing to pay for a unit of the good is the reservation price.
A two-part tariff (TPT) is a form of price discrimination wherein the price of a product or service is composed of two parts – a lump-sum fee as well as a per-unit charge. [1] [2] In general, such a pricing technique only occurs in partially or fully monopolistic markets.
Second-degree price discrimination is also an example of screening, whereby a seller offers a menu of options and the buyer's choice reveals their private information. Specifically, such a strategy attempts to reveal more information about a buyer’s willingness to pay .
Another example of a condemned pricing practice harmful to the single market is geographic price discrimination. A popular case on this issue is the United Brands [ 178 ] case where different Member States were charged varying prices of up to 50% for equivalent transactions with no factual justifications.
The generalized second-price auction (GSP) is a non-truthful auction mechanism for multiple items. Each bidder places a bid. The highest bidder gets the first slot, the second-highest, the second slot and so on, but the highest bidder pays the price bid by the second-highest bidder, the second-highest pays the price bid by the third-highest, and so on.