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In healthcare, Carper's fundamental ways of knowing is a typology that attempts to classify the different sources from which knowledge and beliefs in professional practice (originally specifically nursing) can be or have been derived. It was proposed by Barbara A. Carper, a professor at the College of Nursing at Texas Woman's University, in 1978.
The epistemic virtues, as identified by virtue epistemologists, reflect their contention that belief is an ethical process, and thus susceptible to intellectual virtue or vice. Some epistemic virtues have been identified by W. Jay Wood, based on research into the medieval tradition.
Nursing ethics is a branch of applied ethics that concerns itself with activities in the field of nursing. Nursing ethics shares many principles with medical ethics , such as beneficence , non-maleficence , and respect for autonomy .
Epistemic injustice is injustice related to knowledge. It includes exclusion and silencing ; systematic distortion or misrepresentation of one's meanings or contributions; undervaluing of one's status or standing in communicative practices; unfair distinctions in authority; and unwarranted distrust.
Intellectual responsibility (also known as epistemic responsibility) is the quality of being adequately reflective about the truth of one's beliefs. [1] People are intellectually responsible if they have tried hard enough to be reflective about the truth of their beliefs, aiming not to miss any information that would cause them to abandon those beliefs as false.
Moral sense theory (also known as moral sentimentalism) is a theory in moral epistemology and meta-ethics concerning the discovery of moral truths. Moral sense theory typically holds that distinctions between morality and immorality are discovered by emotional responses to experience.
The virtue of epistemic humility therefore builds in, at the ground level, an acute sense of the fact that epistemic confidence is conditional, complex, contingent, and therefore fragile." [11] For Kidd, while recognition of the fragility of epistemic confidence is a necessary component of epistemic humility, it is not sufficient.
Epistemic privilege or privileged access is the philosophical concept that certain knowledge, such as knowledge of one's own thoughts, can be apprehended directly by a given person and not by others. [1] This implies one has access to, and direct self-knowledge of, their own thoughts in such a way that others do not. [2]