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Removal of “Key Tasks” from the Commander’s Intent in the March 2010 version of FM 5-0 was an overly hasty response to leaders who wrote a litany of prescriptive tasks. The doctrinal result was a neutered statement containing an optional “Purpose”, coupled with a “cookie cutter” end-state that provided little to nothing for ...
Currently there are no examples that explain how to conduct Course of Action (COA) Analysis (commonly called “wargaming”) at the tactical level during other than major combat operations (irregular warfare, stability operations, or counterinsurgency) in any of the relevant US Army doctrinal manuals (ATTP 5-0.1, FMs 3-07, 3-24, or 3-24.2).
Developed to streamline and expedite the orders process, the CONOP has forced leaders to expend time, effort and energy to push the CONOP through the approval process from the lowest to the highest levels; time that should be spent on mission planning.
By codifying into service doctrine an entire chapter on design in FM 5-0, the Army appears to acknowledge the need for ontological approaches to complex systems. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency also featured a new Design chapter when updated in 2006.
Although the campaign utilized SOF TTPs, CENTCOM founded its planning and operations in JP 3-0, Joint Operations, JP 5-0, Joint Planning, and FM 100-5, Operations. CENTCOM’s hybrid use of conventional planning and unconventional execution demonstrated doctrine’s flexibility and adaptability to the changing military environment. CENTCOM ...
Download the Full Article. Sometimes in the course of military operations ill-conceived ideas survive to produce unacceptable outcomes.
Download the Full Article. This paper argues that the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) contains a number of critical flaws that significantly detract from its utility, and while these flaws could be largely circumvented when planning for conventional operations, they are a major barrier to planning for complex operations characterized by “ill-structured problems” and “persistent ...
The Targeting Process: D3A and F3EADby Jimmy A. Gomez Download the Full Article: The Targeting Process: D3A and F3EADSince October 2001, combat operations in the Afghanistan Theater of Operations have presented the U.S. Army with constant evolution of complex situations that have routinely highlighted shortfalls in current doctrinal solutions.
Design and the Prospects for Frame Reflection by Christopher R. Paparone Download The Full Article: Design and the Prospects for Frame Reflection As we arrive to this fifth in a series of essays on design philosophy, it is a good place to pause, step back, and re-appreciate that the meaning of "design" is metaphoric (as are many of its derivative meanings).
Design and the Prospects for Mission Analysisby Christopher R. PaparoneDownload the Full Article: Design and the Prospects for Mission AnalysisThis episode attempts to expose the myth that design is a "methodology" that leads to "understanding" that eventually leads to good military planning as suggested in the US Army's latest doctrine, particularly its Field Manual 5-0, The Operations Process.