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Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War: How Britain Lost Its Empire and the West Lost the World is a book by Patrick J. Buchanan, published in May 2008.Buchanan argues that both World War I and World War II were unnecessary and that the British Empire’s decision to join the wars had a cataclysmic effect globally.
Writing in 1950, Wilmot reflected the frustration of the early Cold War with the outcome of the Second World War that saw the Soviet Union's dominance of eastern Europe and the Balkans, which Wilmot argued could have been avoided. [101] It seemed that instead of making the world safe for democracy, the war had made it safe for communism. [102]
Our principles were right. Had they been followed, war could have been avoided. No good purpose can now be served by considering what might have been, had our objectives been attained. We are at war. Today, though there may be many important subsidiary considerations, the primary objective is not difficult to state.
After World War I the League of Nations was formed in the hope that diplomacy and a united international community of nations could prevent another global war. [2] [3] However, the League and the appeasement of aggressive nations during the invasions of Manchuria, Ethiopia and the annexation of Czechoslovakia was largely considered ineffective.
In the years since the Winter War, it has been speculated that the Winter War could have possibly been avoided had Finland agreed to Soviet demands for military bases and to conclude the "friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance treaty" between countries during the negotiations of 1938-39.
Randall argued in Civil War and Reconstruction that the war "could have been avoided, supposing of course that something more of statesmanship, moderation, and understanding, and something less of professional patrioteering, slogan-making, face-saving, political clamoring, and propaganda, had existed on both sides." But such had not been the case.
The arrival of an American battalion on 19 November prevented any outbreak of violence, but the Italians eventually posted 12,000 troops in the city—"an Italian military occupation in overwhelming force, for political reasons" wrote Admiral Edward Kiddle, [11] and Commodore Howard Kelly, commanding the British Adriatic Force, could remark on ...
Most of the offensive operation would have been performed by American and British forces, as well as Polish forces and as many as 10 divisions of the German Army, remobilised from prisoner-of-war status. Any quick success would be caused by surprise alone.