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In 1975 John Searle suggested that the illocutionary force of indirect speech acts can be derived by means of a Gricean reasoning process; [15] however, the process he proposes does not seem to accurately solve the problem [citation needed].
Searle maintained that even if one was to see a written statement with no knowledge of authorship it would still be impossible to escape the question of intentionality, because "a meaningful sentence is just a standing possibility of the (intentional) speech act". For Searle, ascribing intentionality to a statement was a basic requirement for ...
Searle (1975) set up the following classification of illocutionary speech acts: assertives = speech acts that commit a speaker to the truth of the expressed proposition; directives = speech acts that are to cause the hearer to take a particular action, e.g. requests, commands and advice; commissives = speech acts that commit a speaker to some ...
Searle, J. (1969), Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Searle's has been the most notable of attempts to extend and adjust Austin's conception of speech acts). Searle, J. (1979), Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979 ...
As others have more commonly put the same distinction, saying is a kind of "direct" speech act whereas implicating is an "indirect" speech act. This latter way of drawing the distinction is an important part of John Searle's influential theory of speech acts. [29]
Searle, John, Expression and Meaning. Introduction; Origins of the essays; 1. A taxonomy of illocutionary acts; 2. Indirect speech acts; 3. The logical status of fictional discourse; 4. Metaphor; 5. Literal meaning; 6. Referential and attributive; 7. Speech acts and recent linguistics; Hans Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility (1979)
Searle further claimed that performatives are what he calls declarations; this is a technical notion of Searle's account: according to his conception, an utterance is a declaration, if "the successful performance of the speech act is sufficient to bring about the fit between words and world, to make the propositional content true."
Studying J. L. Austin's theory of the illocutionary act in the perspective of deconstruction, Derrida argued in his 1972 paper "Signature Event Context" that Austin had missed the fact that any speech event is framed by a "structure of absence" (the words that are left unsaid due to contextual constraints) and by "iterability" (the repeatability of linguistic elements outside of their context).