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However, envy-freeness can be weakened in the following way. An allocation X is defined as essentially envy-free (EEF) if, for every agent i, there is a feasible allocation Yi with the same utility profile (all agents are indifferent between X and Yi) in which agent i does not envy anyone. Obviously, every EF allocation is EEF, since we can ...
An envy-free cake-cutting is a kind of fair cake-cutting.It is a division of a heterogeneous resource ("cake") that satisfies the envy-free criterion, namely, that every partner feels that their allocated share is at least as good as any other share, according to their own subjective valuation.
An allocation is called ex-post envy-free if each and every result is envy-free. Obviously, ex-post envy-freeness implies ex-ante envy-freeness, but the opposite might not be true. Local envy-freeness [ 7 ] [ 8 ] (also called: networked envy-freeness [ 9 ] or social envy-freeness [ 10 ] [ 11 ] ) is a weakening of envy-freeness based on a social ...
A procedure by Aziz and Mackenzie (2016) [7] finds an envy-free division for n people in a bounded number of queries. The negative result in the general case is much weaker than in the connected case. All we know is that every algorithm for envy-free division must use at least Ω(n 2) queries. There is a large gap between this result and the ...
The Brams–Taylor procedure (BTP) is a procedure for envy-free cake-cutting. It explicated the first finite procedure to produce an envy-free division of a cake among any positive integer number of players. [1]
A division is called product-envy-free if, for each group, the product of agents' values of the group share is at least the product of their values of the share of any other group. Democratic fairness requires that, in each group, a certain fraction of the agents agree that the division is fair; preferredly this fraction should be at least 1/2.