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Contract theory in economics began with 1991 Nobel Laureate Ronald H. Coase's 1937 article "The Nature of the Firm". Coase notes that "the longer the duration of a contract regarding the supply of goods or services due to the difficulty of forecasting, then the less likely and less appropriate it is for the buyer to specify what the other party should do."
Contractualism is a term in philosophy which refers either to a family of political theories in the social contract tradition (when used in this sense, the term is an umbrella term for all social contract theories that include contractarianism), [1] or to the ethical theory developed in recent years by T. M. Scanlon, especially in his book What We Owe to Each Other (published 1998).
Philip Pettit (b. 1945) has argued, in Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (1997), that the theory of social contract, classically based on the consent of the governed, should be modified. Instead of arguing for explicit consent, which can always be manufactured, Pettit argues that the absence of an effective rebellion against it ...
In modern contract theory, the “theory of the firm” is often identified with the “property rights approach” that was developed by Sanford J. Grossman, Oliver D. Hart, and John H. Moore. [45] [46] The property rights approach to the theory of the firm is also known as the “Grossman–Hart–Moore theory”.
The primary purpose of the hollow state is to function as a multi-organizational structure through which policy is designed and executed. The metaphor "Hollow State" is meant to be understood as a system consisting of units of government separated from their outputs but still linked by negotiation or contract.
Relational contract theory was originally developed in the United States by the legal scholars Ian Roderick Macneil and Stewart Macaulay. According to Macneil, the theory offered a response to the so-called "The Death of Contract" school’s nihilistic argument that a contract was not a fit subject for study as a whole; each different type of contract (e.g., sales, employment, negotiable ...
In this theory, the State is equated with a "stationary bandit" who decides to settle in a specific territory, to unilaterally control it and to generate income from the population (carry out robberies) in the long term. This distinguishes him from "roving bandits" or "itinerant bandits", whose aim is to extract maximum benefit in the short term.
The idea of a complete contract is closely related to the notion of default rules, e.g. legal rules that will fill the gap in a contract in the absence of an agreed upon provision. In economics, the field of contract theory can be subdivided into the theory of complete contracts and the theory of incomplete contracts. [1]