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In economic theory, the principal-agent approach (also called agency theory) is part of the field contract theory. [36] [37] In agency theory, it is typically assumed that complete contracts can be written, an assumption also made in mechanism design theory. Hence, there are no restrictions on the class of feasible contractual arrangements ...
Since there is asymmetric information, where the principal is not necessarily aware of what the agent is doing, moral hazard can exist: the agent can act in such a way that the agent's own interests are met, rather than those of the principal. [4] This is called the principal–agent problem and is an important theory in economics and political ...
In economics, an agent is an actor (more specifically, a decision maker) in a model of some aspect of the economy. Typically, every agent makes decisions by solving a well- or ill-defined optimization or choice problem. For example, buyers and sellers are two common types of agents in partial equilibrium models of a single market.
One example is a principal–agent approach (also called agency theory), where one party, called an agent, acts on behalf of another party, called the principal. However, a principal–agent problem can occur when there is a conflict of interest between the agent and principal. If the agent has more information about his or her actions or ...
An agency cost is an economic concept that refers to the costs associated with the relationship between a "principal" (an organization, person or group of persons), and an "agent". The agent is given powers to make decisions on behalf of the principal.
In modern contract theory, "adverse selection" characterizes principal-agent models in which an agent has private information before a contract is written. [ 23 ] [ 24 ] For example, a worker may know his effort costs (or a buyer may know his willingness-to-pay) before an employer (or a seller) makes a contract offer.
A screening game is a two-player principal–agent type game used in economic and game theoretical modeling. Principal–agent problems are situations where there are two players whose interests are not necessarily matching with each other, and where complete honesty is not optimal for one player.
Examples of this problem are adverse selection [28] and moral hazard. Most commonly, information asymmetries are studied in the context of principal–agent problems. George Akerlof, Michael Spence, and Joseph E. Stiglitz developed the idea and shared the 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics. [29]