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Matthew Owen Jackson is the William D. Eberle Professor of Economics at Stanford University, an external faculty member of the Santa Fe Institute, and a fellow of CIFAR. [1] Jackson's research concerns game theory, microeconomic theory, and the study of social and economic networks. Jackson was one of the founders of the study of networks in ...
He then moved to Stanford University, receiving both his Master's and PhD also in Operations Research there in 1973 and 1974 respectively. [8] After leaving Stanford, Roth went on to teach at the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, which he left in 1982 to become the Andrew W. Mellon professor of economics at the University of Pittsburgh.
Yoav Shoham (Hebrew: יואב שוהם; born 22 January 1956) is a computer scientist and a professor emeritus at Stanford University. [1] His research spans artificial intelligence, logic and game theory. He has also founded and sold several AI companies.
In the run-up to an online auction in 2006 of radio-spectrum licences by America's Federal Communications Commission, Paul Milgrom, a consultant and Stanford University professor, customised his game-theory software to assist a consortium of bidders. The result was a triumph.
The Stanford University Department of Economics appointed Kreps the Adams Distinguished Professor of Management. He is known for his analysis of dynamic choice models and non-cooperative game theory, particularly the idea of sequential equilibrium , which he developed with Stanford Business School colleague Robert B. Wilson .
Roughgarden received his Ph.D. from Cornell University in 2002, under the supervision of Éva Tardos. [2] He did a postdoc at University of California, Berkeley in 2004. From 2004 to 2018, Roughgarden was a professor at the Computer Science department at Stanford University working on algorithms and game theory.
The revelation principle is a fundamental result in mechanism design, social choice theory, and game theory which shows it is always possible to design a strategy-resistant implementation of a social decision-making mechanism (such as an electoral system or market). [1] It can be seen as a kind of mirror image to Gibbard's theorem.
In 1956 he joined the Mathematics faculty of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and has been a visiting professor at Stony Brook University since 1989. He has held visiting professorship at the University of California, Berkeley (1971, 1985–1986), Stanford University (1975–1976, 1980–1981), and Universite Catholique de Louvain (1972, 1978 ...