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Unrestricted domain is one of the conditions for Arrow's impossibility theorem. Under that theorem, it is impossible to have a social choice function that satisfies unrestricted domain, Pareto efficiency, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and non-dictatorship. However, the conditions of the theorem can be satisfied if unrestricted domain ...
Social choice theory is a branch of welfare economics that extends the theory of rational choice to collective decision-making. [1] Social choice studies the behavior of different mathematical procedures (social welfare functions) used to combine individual preferences into a coherent whole.
Kenneth Arrow's monograph Social Choice and Individual Values (1951, 2nd ed., 1963, 3rd ed., 2012) and a theorem within it created modern social choice theory, a rigorous melding of social ethics and voting theory with an economic flavor.
Arrow's theorem assumes as background that any non-degenerate social choice rule will satisfy: [15]. Unrestricted domain — the social choice function is a total function over the domain of all possible orderings of outcomes, not just a partial function.
The revelation principle is a fundamental result in mechanism design, social choice theory, and game theory which shows it is always possible to design a strategy-resistant implementation of a social decision-making mechanism (such as an electoral system or market). [1] It can be seen as a kind of mirror image to Gibbard's theorem.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is an axiom of decision theory which codifies the intuition that a choice between and should not depend on the quality of a third, unrelated outcome . There are several different variations of this axiom, which are generally equivalent under mild conditions.
In social choice theory, Condorcet's voting paradox is a fundamental discovery by the Marquis de Condorcet that majority rule is inherently self-contradictory.The result implies that it is logically impossible for any voting system to guarantee that a winner will have support from a majority of voters: for example there can be rock-paper-scissors scenario where a majority of voters will prefer ...
^May, Kenneth O. 1952. "A set of independent necessary and sufficient conditions for simple majority decisions", Econometrica, Vol. 20, Issue 4, pp. 680–684. JSTOR 1907651; ^ Mark Fey, "May’s Theorem with an Infinite Population", Social Choice and Welfare, 2004, Vol. 23, issue 2, pages 275–293.; ^ Goodin, Robert and Christian List (2006). "A conditional defense of plurality rule ...