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Note that under California Evidence Code ("CEC") §§769, 770, and 1235, prior inconsistent statements may be used for both impeachment and as substantive evidence, even if they were not originally made under oath at a formal proceeding, as long as "the witness was so examined while testifying as to give him an opportunity to explain or to deny ...
In a minority of jurisdictions that follow FRE 801, the prior inconsistent statement may be used not only to impeach but also as substantive evidence. A prior inconsistent statement is admissible as substantive evidence if the statement was given under penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition;
Prior to this case, prior inconsistent statements made by a witness other than an accused could merely be used to impeach the witness's credibility, not for substantive purposes. Here, the Court held that if the statements could be found to be both necessary and reliable then the statements could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Prior inconsistent statements: Many states have departed from the approach of the federal rules with respect to inconsistent statements. Under current law in these jurisdictions, a prior inconsistent statement made by a witness (even when not made under oath at a judicial proceeding or deposition) is admissible as substantive evidence provided ...
Prior Inconsistent Statement – Rule 801(d)(1)(A): Congress amended the proposed rule so that the "rule now requires that the prior inconsistent statement be given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition. The rule as adopted covers statements before a grand jury."
The decision stands for the proposition that the recorded, adopted statement of a witness to a crime inconsistent with her testimony at trial is properly admitted for both purposes of impeachment and as substantive evidence: "for its truth." [2] In Commonwealth v.
Such statements are admissible if a defendant opens the door by presenting conflicting testimony at trial. Quoting Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), it said: [2]...[t]he shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.
Noting that prior statements of a witness that "relate generally to the events and activities testified to" by him must be produced in the Jencks Act, the court said that since the statement in question related to the subject matter as to which the witness had testified, the statute left no room for the trial court, nor for the present court ...