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A philosophical zombie (or "p-zombie") is a being in a thought experiment in the philosophy of mind that is physically identical to a normal human being but does not have conscious experience. [ 1 ] For example, if a philosophical zombie were poked with a sharp object, it would not feel any pain, but it would react exactly the way any conscious ...
In the philosophy of mind, Leibniz's gap is the problem that thoughts cannot be observed or perceived solely by examining brain properties, events, and processes. Here the word "gap" is a metaphor of a subquestion regarding the mind–body problem that allegedly must be answered in order to reach a more profound understanding of qualia, consciousness and emergence.
Type-B Materialism, also known as Weak Reductionism or A Posteriori Physicalism, is the view that the hard problem stems from human psychology, and is therefore not indicative of a genuine ontological gap between consciousness and the physical world. [45] Like Type-A Materialists, Type-B Materialists are committed to physicalism.
Robert Kirk (born 1933) [1] is a British philosopher. He is emeritus professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Nottingham.. Kirk is best known for his work on philosophical zombies—putatively unconscious beings physically and behaviourally identical to human beings.
Leibniz's passage describing the explanatory gap is as follows: It must be confessed, moreover, that perception, and that which depends on it, are inexplicable by mechanical causes, that is, by figures and motions, And, supposing that there were a mechanism so constructed as to think, feel and have perception, we might enter it as into a mill.
The mind–body problem is the problem of explaining how mind relates to matter. The hard problem is a related philosophical problem targeted at physicalist theories of mind specifically: the problem arises because it is not obvious how a purely physical universe could give rise to conscious experience. This is because physical explanations are ...
The essential difference between the easy problems and the hard problem is that the former are at least theoretically answerable via the dominant strategy in the philosophy of mind: physicalism. Chalmers argues for an "explanatory gap" from the objective to the subjective, and criticizes physicalist explanations of mental experience, making him ...
The teletransportation paradox or teletransport paradox (also known in alternative forms as the duplicates paradox) is a thought experiment on the philosophy of identity that challenges common intuitions on the nature of self and consciousness, formulated by Derek Parfit in his 1984 book Reasons and Persons. [1]