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Philosophical realism—usually not treated as a position of its own but as a stance towards other subject matters—is the view that a certain kind of thing (ranging widely from abstract objects like numbers to moral statements to the physical world itself) has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it exists even in the absence of any mind perceiving it or that its existence is not just a ...
Philosophy; Psychology ... The philosophy of education is the branch of ... Harry S. Broudy's philosophical views were based on the tradition of classical realism ...
Solipsism (/ ˈ s ɒ l ɪ p s ɪ z əm / ⓘ SOLL-ip-siz-əm; from Latin solus 'alone' and ipse 'self') [1] is the philosophical idea that only one's mind is sure to exist. As an epistemological position, solipsism holds that knowledge of anything outside one's own mind is unsure; the external world and other minds cannot be known and might not exist outside the mind.
Direct realism, also known as naïve realism, argues we perceive the world directly. In the philosophy of perception and philosophy of mind, direct or naïve realism, as opposed to indirect or representational realism, are differing models that describe the nature of conscious experiences; [1] [2] out of the metaphysical question of whether the world we see around us is the real world itself ...
Naïve realism argues we perceive the world directly. In philosophy of perception and epistemology, naïve realism (also known as direct realism or perceptual realism) is the idea that the senses provide us with direct awareness of objects as they really are. [1] When referred to as direct realism, naïve realism is often contrasted with ...
In philosophy of science and in epistemology, instrumentalism is a methodological view that ideas are useful instruments, and that the worth of an idea is based on how effective it is in explaining and predicting natural phenomena.
In contemporary philosophy, most Platonists trace their ideas to Gottlob Frege's influential paper "Thought", which argues for Platonism with respect to propositions, and his influential book, The Foundations of Arithmetic, which argues for Platonism with respect to numbers and is a seminal text of the logicist project. [21]
Irrealism was initially motivated by the debate between phenomenalism and physicalism in epistemology. [2] Rather than viewing either as prior to the other, Goodman described them both as alternative "world-versions", both useful in some circumstances, but neither capable of capturing the other in an entirely satisfactory way, a point he emphasizes with examples from psychology. [3]