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Gibbard's theorem states that a deterministic process of collective decision cannot be strategyproof, except possibly in two cases: if there is a distinguished agent who has a dictatorial power (unilateral), or if the process limits the outcome to two possible options only (duple).
Allan Fletcher Gibbard (born 1942) is the Richard B. Brandt Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. [1] Gibbard has made major contributions to contemporary ethical theory, in particular metaethics, where he has developed a contemporary version of non-cognitivism.
The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem is a theorem in social choice theory.It was first conjectured by the philosopher Michael Dummett and the mathematician Robin Farquharson in 1961 [1] and then proved independently by the philosopher Allan Gibbard in 1973 [2] and economist Mark Satterthwaite in 1975. [3]
In metaphilosophy and ethics, metaethics is the study of the nature, scope, ground, and meaning of moral judgment, ethical belief, or values.It is one of the three branches of ethics generally studied by philosophers, the others being normative ethics (questions of how one ought to be and act) and applied ethics (practical questions of right behavior in given, usually contentious, situations).
In the social sciences, the term "normative" has broadly the same meaning as its usage in philosophy, but may also relate, in a sociological context, to the role of cultural 'norms'; the shared values or institutions that structural functionalists regard as constitutive of the social structure and social cohesion.
The revelation principle shows that, while Gibbard's theorem proves it is impossible to design a system that will always be fully invulnerable to strategy (if we do not know how players will behave), it is possible to design a system that encourages honesty given a solution concept (if the corresponding equilibrium is unique). [3] [4]
In meta-ethics, expressivism is a theory about the meaning of moral language.According to expressivism [citation needed], sentences that employ moral terms – for example, "It is wrong to torture an innocent human being" – are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as "wrong", "good", or "just" do not refer to real, in-the-world properties.
Thick concepts thus seem to occupy a 'middle position' between (thin) descriptive concepts and (thin) evaluative concepts. Descriptive concepts such as water, gold, length and mass are commonly believed to pick out features of the world rather than provide reasons for action, whereas evaluative concepts such as right and good are commonly believed to provide reasons for action rather than ...