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[76] [71] Such display and the resulting favorable attention can improve a hunter's reputation by providing information about his phenotypic quality. High quality signallers are more successful in acquiring mates and allies. Thus, costly signalling theory can explain apparently wasteful and altruistic behaviour. [28] [36] [75] [77] [78] [28] [79]
In Grafen's model, the courting male's quality is signalled by investment in an extravagant trait—similar to the peacock's tail. The signal is reliable if the cost to the signaller of producing it is proportionately lower for higher-quality signallers than for lower-quality ones. [1]
The majority of costly signaling explanations involve behaviors that broadcast beneficial traits about oneself to others. [17] In many instances, these signals are expected to be directed towards potential mates, with males often thought to benefit more from such signaling due to their relatively low levels of investment in offspring leading to greater fitness benefits in having multiple partners.
Signalling (or signaling; see spelling differences) in contract theory is the idea that one party (the agent) credibly conveys some information about itself to another party (the principal). Signalling was already discussed and mentioned in the seminal Theory of Games and Economic Behavior , which is considered to be the text that created the ...
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A system with high quality factor (Q > 1 / 2 ) is said to be underdamped. Underdamped systems combine oscillation at a specific frequency with a decay of the amplitude of the signal. Underdamped systems with a low quality factor (a little above Q = 1 / 2 ) may oscillate only once or a few times before dying out. As the quality ...
There are several measures (metrics) which are commonly used to judge how well an algorithm is doing on training data and to compare the performance of different MLR algorithms. Often a learning-to-rank problem is reformulated as an optimization problem with respect to one of these metrics. Examples of ranking quality measures:
This is the case, for example, when the price of a good, such as a used car, is lowered by the buyers' uncertainty about its quality. An overconfident buyer unaware of their lack of knowledge may be willing to pay a much higher price because they do not take into account all the potential flaws and risks relevant to the price. [2]