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A corollary of this theorem is the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem about voting rules. The key difference between the two theorems is that Gibbard–Satterthwaite applies only to ranked voting. Because of its broader scope, Gibbard's theorem makes no claim about whether voters need to reverse their ranking of candidates, only that their optimal ...
Gibbard's proof of the theorem is more general and covers processes of collective decision that may not be ordinal, such as cardinal voting. [note 1] Gibbard's 1978 theorem and Hylland's theorem are even more general and extend these results to non-deterministic processes, where the outcome may depend partly on chance; the Duggan–Schwartz ...
On a rated ballot, the voter may rate each choice independently. An approval voting ballot does not require ranking or exclusivity. Rated, evaluative, [1] [2] graded, [1] or cardinal voting rules are a class of voting methods that allow voters to state how strongly they support a candidate, [3] by giving each one a grade on a separate scale.
Strategic or tactical voting is voting in consideration of possible ballots cast by other voters in order to maximize one's satisfaction with the election's results. [1] Gibbard's theorem shows that no voting system has a single "always-best" strategy, i.e. one that always maximizes a voter's satisfaction with the result, regardless of other ...
The highest median voting rules are a class of graded voting rules where the candidate with the highest median rating is elected. The various highest median rules differ in their treatment of ties, i.e., the method of ranking the candidates with the same median rating.
The plurality-rule family of voting methods is a system of ranked voting rules based on, and closely-related to, first-preference plurality. [1] These rules include Instant-runoff (ranked choice) voting, and descending acquiescing coalitions.
The practical criteria to assess real elections include the share of wasted votes, the complexity of vote counting, proportionality of the representation elected based on parties' shares of votes, and barriers to entry for new political movements. [23] Additional opportunities for comparison of real elections arise through electoral reforms.
The revelation principle shows that, while Gibbard's theorem proves it is impossible to design a system that will always be fully invulnerable to strategy (if we do not know how players will behave), it is possible to design a system that encourages honesty given a solution concept (if the corresponding equilibrium is unique). [3] [4]