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A value judgment (or normative judgement) is a judgment of the rightness or wrongness of something or someone, or of the usefulness of something or someone, based on a comparison or other relativity. As a generalization, a value judgment can refer to a judgment based upon a particular set of values or on a particular value system. A related ...
Since the subjective value holds that buyers use their own value judgements, the same goes for sellers, and thus the mechanism of production. Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises believes that production costs are determined by a seller's evaluations of their opportunity costs , or the sellers "marginal utility lost of having fewer of that good ...
[47] For example, in the sentence "Slavery was good in Ancient Rome", Stevenson thinks one is speaking of past attitudes in an "almost purely descriptive" sense. [47] And in some discussions of current attitudes, "agreement in attitude can be taken for granted," so a judgment like "He was wrong to kill them" might describe one's attitudes yet ...
An example of a normative economic statement is as follows: The price of milk should be $6 a gallon to give dairy farmers a higher standard of living. This is a normative statement, because it reflects value judgments; this specific statement makes the judgment that the benefits of the policy outweigh its costs. [2]
Value theory, also known as axiology and theory of values, is the systematic study of values.As the branch of philosophy examining which things are good and what it means for something to be good, it distinguishes different types of values and explores how they can be measured and compared.
In metaphilosophy and ethics, metaethics is the study of the nature, scope, ground, and meaning of moral judgment, ethical belief, or values.It is one of the three branches of ethics generally studied by philosophers, the others being normative ethics (questions of how one ought to be and act) and applied ethics (practical questions of right behavior in given, usually contentious, situations).
The fact–value distinction is also closely related to the moralistic fallacy, an invalid inference of factual conclusions from purely evaluative premises. For example, an invalid inference "Because everybody ought to be equal, there are no innate genetic differences between people" is an instance of the moralistic fallacy.
Max Scheler, one of the main early proponents of axiological ethics, agrees with Brentano that experience is a reliable source for the knowledge of values. [ 10 ] [ 6 ] Scheler, following the phenomenological method , holds that this knowledge is not just restricted to particular cases but that we can gain insight a priori into the essence of ...