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The subgame perfect equilibrium in addition to the Nash equilibrium requires that the strategy also is a Nash equilibrium in every subgame of that game. This eliminates all non-credible threats , that is, strategies that contain non-rational moves in order to make the counter-player change their strategy.
In game theory, a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), or subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept, specifically designed for dynamic games where players make sequential decisions. A strategy profile is an SPE if it represents a Nash equilibrium in every possible subgame of the original game ...
In game theory, the best response is the strategy (or strategies) which produces the most favorable outcome for a player, taking other players' strategies as given. [1] The concept of a best response is central to John Nash's best-known contribution, the Nash equilibrium, the point at which each player in a game has selected the best response (or one of the best responses) to the other players ...
A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile (a strategy profile specifies a strategy for every player, e.g. in the above prisoners' dilemma game (cooperate, defect) specifies that prisoner 1 plays cooperate and prisoner 2 plays defect) in which every strategy played by every agent (agent i) is a best response to every other strategy played by all the other opponents (agents j for every j≠i) .
A Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) is a Nash equilibrium for a Bayesian game, which is derived from the ex-ante normal form game associated with the Bayesian framework. In a traditional (non-Bayesian) game, a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if every player's strategy is a best response to the other players' strategies. In this situation ...
In this equilibrium, every strategy is rational given the beliefs held and every belief is consistent with the strategies played. Notice how the imperfection of information changes the outcome of the game. To more easily solve this game for the Nash equilibrium, [3] it can be converted to the normal form. [4]
The potential function is a useful tool to analyze equilibrium properties of games, since the incentives of all players are mapped into one function, and the set of pure Nash equilibria can be found by locating the local optima of the potential function. Convergence and finite-time convergence of an iterated game towards a Nash equilibrium can ...
In a non-repeated or finite-horizon ultimatum game, the first Nash equilibria (unfair offer, always accept) are the only that satisfy a stricter condition called subgame perfection equilibrium (SPE). The game can be viewed as having two subgames that repeat themselves: the subgame where the proposer makes a fair offer, and the subgame where the ...