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In game theory and economics, a mechanism is called incentive-compatible (IC) [1]: 415 if every participant can achieve their own best outcome by reporting their true preferences. [ 1 ] : 225 [ 2 ] For example, there is incentive compatibility if high-risk clients are better off in identifying themselves as high-risk to insurance firms , who ...
In this case, the game is called a Bayesian game. In games that have a varying degree of complete information and game type, there are different methods available to the player to solve the game based on this information. In games with static, complete information, the approach to solve is to use Nash equilibrium to find viable strategies.
When the players have private information (e.g. their type or their value to some item), and the strategy space of each player consists of the possible information values (e.g. possible types or values), a truthful mechanism is a game in which revealing the true information is a weakly-dominant strategy for each player.
Chess is an example of a game of perfect information. In economics , perfect information (sometimes referred to as "no hidden information") is a feature of perfect competition . With perfect information in a market, all consumers and producers have complete and instantaneous knowledge of all market prices, their own utility, and own cost functions.
In game theory, the one-shot deviation principle (also known as the single-deviation property [1]) is a principle used to determine whether a strategy in a sequential game constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium [2]. An SPE is a Nash equilibrium where no player has an incentive to deviate in any subgame.
In game theory, a Bayesian game is a strategic decision-making model which assumes players have incomplete information. Players may hold private information relevant to the game, meaning that the payoffs are not common knowledge. [1] Bayesian games model the outcome of player interactions using aspects of Bayesian probability.
The first game is simply sequential―when player 2 makes a choice, both parties are already aware of whether player 1 has chosen O(pera) or F(ootball). The second game is also sequential, but the dotted line shows player 2's information set. This is the common way to show that when player 2 moves, he or she is not aware of what player 1 did.
In game theory, cheap talk is communication between players that does not directly affect the payoffs of the game. Providing and receiving information is free. This is in contrast to signalling, in which sending certain messages may be costly for the sender depending on the state of the world.