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In ethics, welfarism is a theory that well-being, what is good for someone or what makes a life worth living, is the only thing that has intrinsic value.In its most general sense, it can be defined as descriptive theory about what has value but some philosophers also understand welfarism as a moral theory, that what one should do is ultimately determined by considerations of well-being.
The argument from disagreement, also known as the argument from relativity, first observes that there is a lot of intractable moral disagreement: people disagree about what is right and what is wrong. [3] Mackie argues that the best explanation of this is that right and wrong are invented, not objective truths.
Frankfurt's examples are significant because they suggest an alternative way to defend the compatibility of moral responsibility and determinism, in particular by rejecting the first premise of the argument. According to this view, responsibility is compatible with determinism because responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise.
Such examples are quite common and can include cases from everyday life, stories, or thought experiments, like Sartre's student or Sophie's Choice discussed in the section on examples. [10] The strength of arguments based on examples rests on the intuition that these cases actually are examples of genuine ethical dilemmas.
Omnipotence: These moral standards would limit God's power: not even God could oppose them by commanding what is evil and thereby making it good. This point was influential in Islamic theology: "In relation to God, objective values appeared as a limiting factor to His power to do as He wills...
[12]: 115 For example, Christian writer and medievalist C. S. Lewis made the argument in his popular book Mere Christianity that if a supernatural, objective standard of right and wrong does not exist outside of the natural world, then right and wrong becomes mired in the is-ought problem. Thus, he wrote, preferences for one moral standard over ...
This is the most famous argument against negative utilitarianism, [7] and it is directed against sufficiently strong versions of negative utilitarianism. [31] Many authors have endorsed this argument, [32] and some have presented counterarguments against it. Below are replies to this argument that have been presented and discussed.
The open-question argument is a philosophical argument put forward by British philosopher G. E. Moore in §13 of Principia Ethica (1903), [1] to refute the equating of the property of goodness with some non-moral property, X, whether natural (e.g. pleasure) or supernatural (e.g. God's command).