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The auctioneer does not disclose the current maximum bid, but the second highest bid is always public. In proxy bidding, the wise bidder must know in advance the "true" value of an item as a basis for their secret bidding limit. [2] The fact that the maximum bid is revealed when it is outbid introduces the possibility of maximum bid fishing.
Proxy bidding is an implementation of an English second-price auction used on eBay, in which the winning bidder pays the price of the second-highest bid plus a defined increment. It differs from a Vickrey auction in that bids are not sealed ; the "current highest bid" (defined as second-highest bid plus bid increment) is always displayed.
In the case of the second-price ruling as in a Vickrey auction, the final price for the winner is based on the second bidder's price. A Proxy bid is a special case of second-price ruling used by eBay, where a predefined increment is added to the second highest bid in response to a yet higher bid.
In France, when the last bid has been made in an auction for an art object, a representative of the state can say "Préemption de l'état" ("Pre-emption of the state") and buy the object for the highest bid. [4] Some housing cooperatives similarly allow members of the cooperative to pre-empt any buyer of a house constructed by the cooperative. [5]
In 2011, a bidder on eBay became the first individual to be convicted of shill bidding on an auction. [26] By taking part in the process, an individual is sometimes breaking the law, depending on the relevant jurisdiction, for example breaking the European Union fair trading rules which carries out a fine of up to £5,000 in the United Kingdom ...
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In a second-price auction, the auctioneer receives the minimum of the two truthful bids, which is (,). In both cases, the auctioneer's expected revenue is 1/3. This fact that the revenue is the same is not a coincidence - it is a special case of the revenue equivalence theorem.
The uniform-price auction does not, however, result in bidders bidding their true valuations as they do in a second-price auction unless each bidder has demand for only a single unit. A generalization of the Vickrey auction that maintains the incentive to bid truthfully is known as the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism. The idea in VCG ...