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David Benatar argues that there is a crucial asymmetry between the good and the bad things, such as pleasure and pain: 1. the presence of pain is bad; 2. the presence of pleasure is good; however 3. the absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone;
Schadenfreude (/ ˈ ʃ ɑː d ən f r ɔɪ d ə /; German: [ˈʃaːdn̩ˌfʁɔʏ̯də] ⓘ; lit. Tooltip literal translation "harm-joy") is the experience of pleasure, joy, or self-satisfaction that comes from learning of or witnessing the troubles, failures, pain, suffering, or humiliation of another.
In short, pessimists view existence, overall, as having a deleterious effect on living beings: to be alive is to be put in a bad position. [5]: 4 [6]: 27–29 [7] [11] The bad prevails over the good — generally, the bad wins over the good. [9] [2] This can be understood in two ways. Firstly, one can make a case that — irrespective of the ...
Benatar argues that there is what he calls an asymmetry between good and bad things, such as pleasure and pain: The absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone, whereas; The absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation. [5]
For Pyrrhonism, suffering comes from dogmas (i.e. beliefs regarding non-evident matters), most particularly beliefs that certain things are either good or bad by nature. Suffering can be removed by developing epoche (suspension of judgment) regarding beliefs, which leads to ataraxia (mental tranquility).
Additionally, although some people may turn out to be happy, this is not guaranteed, so to procreate is to gamble with another person's suffering. There is also an axiological asymmetry between good and bad things in life, such that coming into existence is always a harm, which is known as Benatar's asymmetry argument.
G. E. Moore's ethics can be said to be a negative consequentialism (more precisely, a consequentialism with a negative utilitarian component), because he has been labeled a consequentialist, [11] and he said that "consciousness of intense pain is, by itself, a great evil" [12] whereas "the mere consciousness of pleasure, however intense, does not, by itself, appear to be a great good, even if ...
There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some ...