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A reverse auction (also known as buyer-determined auction or procurement auction) is a type of auction in which the traditional roles of buyer and seller are reversed. [1] Thus, there is one buyer and many potential sellers.
A former AIG legal ops director and two current leaders at GSK weighed in on why legal departments might want to take reverse auctions into consideration, if they aren't already using this tactic.
Popularized by the reverse auction pioneer, Priceline.com, such pricing strategy asks consumers to 'name their own price' for various products and services like air tickets, hotels, rental cars, etc. [4] The first bid a consumer places and the subsequent bid increments express the consumer's willingness or unwillingness to haggle. "The economic ...
A reverse auction is a type of auction in which the roles of the buyer and the seller are reversed, with the primary objective to drive purchase prices downward. [41] While ordinary auctions provide suppliers the opportunity to find the best price among interested buyers, reverse auctions and buyer-determined auctions give buyers a chance to ...
A request for proposal (RFP) is a form of reverse auction that solicits a business proposal by an organisation interested in the procurement of a service or product from potential suppliers. [1] It is usually part of a complex sales process, and made through a bidding process. [citation needed]
An online auction (also electronic auction, e-auction, virtual auction, or eAuction) is an auction held over the internet and accessed by internet connected devices. [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] Similar to in-person auctions, online auctions come in a variety of types , with different bidding and selling rules.
An English auction is an open-outcry ascending dynamic auction. It proceeds as follows. It proceeds as follows. The auctioneer opens the auction by announcing a suggested opening bid, a starting price, or a reserve for the item on sale.
In fact, we can use revenue equivalence to prove that many types of auctions are revenue equivalent. For example, the first price auction, second price auction, and the all-pay auction are all revenue equivalent when the bidders are symmetric (that is, their valuations are independent and identically distributed).