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Merleau-Ponty demonstrates a corporeity of consciousness as much as an intentionality of the body, and so stands in contrast with the dualist ontology of mind and body in Descartes, a philosopher to whom Merleau-Ponty continually returned, despite the important differences that separate them.
Merleau-Ponty's account of the body helps him undermine what had been a long-standing conception of consciousness, which hinges on the distinction between the for-itself (subject) and in-itself (object), which plays a central role in the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, whose Being and Nothingness was released in 1943. The body stands between ...
Additionally, the parts of a body that move when performing a task are isolated from the rest of her body, which remains immobile. Merleau-Ponty explains that women thus see their bodies as both the subject and object of an action; for example, "women have a tendency to take up the motion of an object coming toward them as coming at them."
Merleau-Ponty reinterprets concepts like intentionality, the phenomenological reduction, and the eidetic method to capture our inherence in the perceived world, that is, our embodied coexistence with things through a kind of reciprocal exchange.
Merleau-Ponty, inspired by Heidegger's notion of ‘being-in-the world’ from “Being and Time”, [14] sought to situate the experience of ‘being-in-the-world’ as the root of human perception and the source of objectivity. According to Merleau-Ponty, there are no objects prior to human perception of them.
Enactivism and embodied cognition stress the tight coupling between the cognitive processes, the body, and the environment. [19] Enactivism builds upon the work of other scholars who could be considered as proto externalists; these include Gregory Bateson, James J. Gibson, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Eleanor Rosch and many others. These thinkers ...
Maurice Merleau-Ponty argued that the lesson of Husserl's reduction is that "there is no complete reduction" because even phenomenologists cannot resist how they have been shaped by their history, culture, society, and language. [4]
Higher-order theories of consciousness postulate that consciousness consists in perceptions or thoughts about first-order mental states. [1] [2] [3] In particular, phenomenal consciousness is thought to be a higher-order representation of perceptual or quasi-perceptual contents, such as visual images.