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[2] A metaethical theory, unlike a normative ethical theory, does not attempt to evaluate specific choices as being better, worse, good, bad, or evil; although it may have profound implications as to the validity and meaning of normative ethical claims. An answer to any of the three example questions above would not itself be a normative ...
[1] [2] [3] Hence, it is colloquially known as the hurrah/boo theory. [4] Influenced by the growth of analytic philosophy and logical positivism in the 20th century, the theory was stated vividly by A. J. Ayer in his 1936 book Language, Truth and Logic , [ 5 ] but its development owes more to C. L. Stevenson .
Divine command theory (also known as theological voluntarism) [1] [2] is a meta-ethical theory which proposes that an action's status as morally good is equivalent to whether it is commanded by God. The theory asserts that what is moral is determined by God's commands and that for a person to be moral he is to follow God's commands.
Thus, Blackburn's theory of quasi-realism provides a coherent account of ethical pluralism. It also answers John Mackie's concerns, presented in his argument from queerness, about the apparently contradictory nature of ethics. Quasi-realism, a meta-ethical approach, enables ethics based on actions, virtues and consequences to be reconciled.
Ethical extensionism or moral extensionism is a metaethical or metaphilosophical approach in environmental ethics and animal ethics that extends existing ethical theories and concepts to include entities (animals, plants, species, the earth) that are traditionally excluded.
Although divine command theory is considered by some to be a form of ethical subjectivism, [27] defenders of the perspective that divine command theory is not a form of ethical subjectivism say this is based on a misunderstanding: that divine command proponents claim that moral propositions are about what attitudes God holds, but this ...
Ethical naturalism encompasses any reduction of ethical properties, such as 'goodness', to non-ethical properties; there are many different examples of such reductions, and thus many different varieties of ethical naturalism. Hedonism, for example, is the view that goodness is ultimately just pleasure. [4]
Moral skepticism (or moral scepticism in British English) is a class of meta-ethical theories all members of which entail that no one has any moral knowledge. Many moral skeptics also make the stronger, modal claim that moral knowledge is impossible.