Search results
Results From The WOW.Com Content Network
Modularity of mind is the notion that a mind may, at least in part, be composed of innate neural structures or mental modules which have distinct, established, and evolutionarily developed functions. However, different definitions of "module" have been proposed by different authors.
A cognitive module in cognitive psychology is a specialized tool or sub-unit that can be used by other parts to resolve cognitive tasks. It is used in theories of the modularity of mind and the closely related society of mind theory and was developed by Jerry Fodor.
The relationship between domain general learning and domain specific learning (also known as the modularity debate or modularity of mind) has been an ongoing debate for evolutionary psychologists. [7] The modularity of mind or modularity debate states that the brain is constructed of neural structures (or modules) which have distinct functions.
The first is the theory of modularity. Stemming from phrenology, this theory supports functional specialization, suggesting the brain has different modules that are domain specific in function. The second theory, distributive processing, proposes that the brain is more interactive and its regions are functionally interconnected rather than ...
Modularity is the degree to which a system's components may be separated and recombined, often with the benefit of flexibility and variety in use. [1] The concept of modularity is used primarily to reduce complexity by breaking a system into varying degrees of interdependence and independence across and "hide the complexity of each part behind an abstraction and interface". [2]
More recently faculty psychology has been revived by Jerry Fodor's concept of modularity of mind, the hypothesis that different modules autonomously manage sensory input as well as other mental functions. Faculty psychology resembles localization of function, the claim that specific cognitive functions are performed in specific areas of the brain.
The position is a close relative of modularity of mind, but is considered more general in that it does not necessarily entail all the assumptions of Fodorian modularity (e.g., informational encapsulation). Instead, it is properly described as a variant of psychological nativism. Other cognitive scientists also hold the mind to be modular ...
An early supporter was Jerry Fodor, who argued that the mind functions partly, by innate, domain-specific mental modules. [3] In Modularity of Mind, Fodor proposed the Hypothesis of Modest Modularity, stating that input systems such as perception and language are modular, whereas central systems such as belief fixation and practical reasoning ...