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In cooperative game theory, the Shapley value is a method (solution concept) for fairly distributing the total gains or costs among a group of players who have collaborated. For example, in a team project where each member contributed differently, the Shapley value provides a way to determine how much credit or blame each member deserves.
The Shapley value is mainly applicable to the following situation: the contribution of each actor is not equal, but each participant cooperates with each other to obtain profit or return. The efficiency of the resource allocation and combination of the two distribution methods are more reasonable and fair, and it also reflects the process of ...
The Shapley–Shubik power index was formulated by Lloyd Shapley and Martin Shubik in 1954 to measure the powers of players in a voting game. [1] The constituents of a voting system, such as legislative bodies, executives, shareholders, individual legislators, and so forth, can be viewed as players in an n-player game. Players with the same ...
The approach proposed in [9] uses the Shapley value. Because of the time-complexity hardness of the Shapley value calculation, most efforts in this domain are driven into implementing new algorithms and methods which rely on a peculiar topology of the network or a special character of the problem.
The ingredients of a stochastic game are: a finite set of players ; a state space (either a finite set or a measurable space (,)); for each player , an action set (either a finite set or a measurable space (,)); a transition probability from , where = is the action profiles, to , where (,) is the probability that the next state is in given the current state and the current action profile ; and ...
The game is a potential game (Monderer and Shapley 1996-a,1996-b) The game has generic payoffs and is 2 × N (Berger 2005) Fictitious play does not always converge, however. Shapley (1964) proved that in the game pictured here (a nonzero-sum version of Rock, Paper, Scissors), if the players start by choosing (a, B), the play will cycle ...
Along with the Shapley value, stochastic games, the Bondareva–Shapley theorem (which implies that convex games have non-empty cores), the Shapley–Shubik power index (for weighted or block voting power), the Gale–Shapley algorithm for the stable marriage problem, the concept of a potential game (with Dov Monderer), the Aumann–Shapley ...
Shapley effects rely on Shapley values and represent the average marginal contribution of a given factors across all possible combinations of factors. These value are related to Sobol’s indices as their value falls between the first order Sobol’ effect and the total order effect.