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The Shapley value is one way to distribute the total gains to the players, assuming that they all collaborate. It is a "fair" distribution in the sense that it is the only distribution with certain desirable properties listed below. According to the Shapley value, [5] the amount that player i is given in a coalitional game (,) is
The Shapley value is mainly applicable to the following situation: the contribution of each actor is not equal, but each participant cooperates with each other to obtain profit or return. The efficiency of the resource allocation and combination of the two distribution methods are more reasonable and fair, and it also reflects the process of ...
The Shapley value is the unique payoff vector that is efficient, symmetric, and satisfies monotonicity. [14] It was introduced by Lloyd Shapley (Shapley 1953) who showed that it is the unique payoff vector that is efficient, symmetric, additive, and assigns zero payoffs to dummy players.
The ingredients of a stochastic game are: a finite set of players ; a state space (either a finite set or a measurable space (,)); for each player , an action set (either a finite set or a measurable space (,)); a transition probability from , where = is the action profiles, to , where (,) is the probability that the next state is in given the current state and the current action profile ; and ...
The Shapley value is the only value that satisfies this property, plus 2, 3, and 5. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 193.147.86.254 17:26, 14 September 2007 (UTC) You are right. Just take v(N) and divide it evenly among the players. This is another solution, different from the Shapley value, that satisfies 2, 3, and 5.
The approach proposed in [9] uses the Shapley value. Because of the time-complexity hardness of the Shapley value calculation, most efforts in this domain are driven into implementing new algorithms and methods which rely on a peculiar topology of the network or a special character of the problem.
In 1962, David Gale and Lloyd Shapley proved that, for any equal number of men and women, it is always possible to solve the stable marriage problem and make all marriages stable. They presented an algorithm to do so. [9] [10] The Gale–Shapley algorithm (also known as the deferred acceptance algorithm) involves a number of "rounds" (or ...
A stable matching always exists, and the algorithmic problem solved by the Gale–Shapley algorithm is to find one. [3] The stable matching problem has also been called the stable marriage problem, using a metaphor of marriage between men and women, and many sources describe the Gale–Shapley algorithm in terms of marriage proposals. However ...