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A Walrasian auction, introduced by Léon Walras, is a type of simultaneous auction where each agent calculates its demand for the good at every possible price and submits this to an auctioneer. The price is then set so that the total demand across all agents equals the total amount of the good.
Competitive equilibrium (also called: Walrasian equilibrium) is a concept of economic equilibrium, introduced by Kenneth Arrow and Gérard Debreu in 1951, [1] appropriate for the analysis of commodity markets with flexible prices and many traders, and serving as the benchmark of efficiency in economic analysis.
The Walrasian auction is a type of simultaneous auction where each agent calculates its demand for the good at every possible price and submits this to an auctioneer. The price is then set so that the total demand across all agents equals the total amount of the good. Thus, a Walrasian auction perfectly matches the supply and the demand.
Walras's law is a consequence of finite budgets. If a consumer spends more on good A then they must spend and therefore demand less of good B, reducing B's price. The sum of the values of excess demands across all markets must equal zero, whether or not the economy is in a general equilibrium.
Auction theory is a branch of applied economics that deals with how bidders act in auctions and researches how the features of auctions incentivise predictable outcomes. Auction theory is a tool used to inform the design of real-world auctions. Sellers use auction theory to raise higher revenues while allowing buyers to procure at a lower cost.
A uniform price auction otherwise known as a "clearing price auction", pay-as-clear [1] or marginal price auction, "marginal price system" (MPS), [2] is a multiunit auction in which a fixed number of identical units of a homogenous commodity are sold for the same price. Each bidder in the auction may submit (possibly multiple) bids, designating ...
In fact, we can use revenue equivalence to prove that many types of auctions are revenue equivalent. For example, the first price auction, second price auction, and the all-pay auction are all revenue equivalent when the bidders are symmetric (that is, their valuations are independent and identically distributed).
[1]: 164 A useful property of the quasilinear utility function is that the Marshallian/Walrasian demand for , …, does not depend on wealth and is thus not subject to a wealth effect; [1]: 165–166 The absence of a wealth effect simplifies analysis [1]: 222 and makes quasilinear utility functions a common choice for modelling.