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Interest in the iterated prisoner's dilemma was kindled by Robert Axelrod in his 1984 book The Evolution of Cooperation, in which he reports on a tournament that he organized of the N-step prisoner's dilemma (with N fixed) in which participants have to choose their strategy repeatedly and remember their previous encounters. Axelrod invited ...
It is a compendium of seven articles that previously appeared in journals on a variety of subjects. The book extends Axelrod's method of applying the results of game theory, in particular that derived from analysis of the Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) problem, to real world situations.
Tit-for-tat has been very successfully used as a strategy for the iterated prisoner's dilemma. The strategy was first introduced by Anatol Rapoport in Robert Axelrod's two tournaments, [3] held around 1980. Notably, it was (on both occasions) both the simplest strategy and the most successful in direct competition.
Several software packages have been created to run prisoner's dilemma simulations and tournaments, some of which have available source code. The source code for the second tournament run by Robert Axelrod (written by Axelrod and many contributors in Fortran) is available online. [45] PRISON, [46] a library written in Java, last updated in 1999
Robert Marshall Axelrod (born May 27, 1943) is an American political scientist. He is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the University of Michigan where he has been since 1974. He is best known for his interdisciplinary work on the evolution of cooperation .
In Robert Axelrod's book The Evolution of Cooperation, grim trigger is called "Friedman", [1] for a 1971 paper by James W. Friedman, which uses the concept. [ 2 ] [ 3 ] The infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
2 infinite [2] 1 N/A [3] N/A [3] Yes No Diner's dilemma: N: 2 1 No No No No Dollar auction: 2 2 0 Yes Yes No No El Farol bar: N: 2 variable No No No No Game without a value: 2 infinite 0 No No Yes No Gift-exchange game: N, usually 2 variable 1 Yes Yes No No Guess 2/3 of the average: N: infinite 1 No No Maybe [4] No Hobbesian trap: 2 2 1 No No ...
Axelrod linked Live and Let Live to the co-operative strategy referred to as Tit for Tat. Axelrod's interpretation of "Live and Let Live" as a prisoner's dilemma has been disputed by political scientists Joanne Gowa [ 3 ] and Andrew Gelman , [ 4 ] who (separately) argue that the assumptions underlying the prisoner's dilemma do not hold in this ...