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The term naturalistic fallacy is sometimes used to label the problematic inference of an ought from an is (the is–ought problem). [3] Michael Ridge relevantly elaborates that "[t]he intuitive idea is that evaluative conclusions require at least one evaluative premise—purely factual premises about the naturalistic features of things do not entail or even support evaluative conclusions."
Moralistic fallacy is the inverse of naturalistic fallacy. Moving the goalposts (raising the bar) – argument in which evidence presented in response to a specific claim is dismissed and some other (often greater) evidence is demanded. Nirvana fallacy (perfect-solution fallacy) – solutions to problems are rejected because they are not perfect.
A similar view is defended by G. E. Moore's open-question argument, intended to refute any identification of moral properties with natural properties, which is asserted by ethical naturalists, who do not deem the naturalistic fallacy a fallacy. The is–ought problem is closely related to the fact–value distinction in epistemology.
A naturalistic fallacy can occur, for example, in the case of sheer quantity metrics based on the premise "more is better" [43] or, in the case of developmental assessment in the field of psychology, "higher is better". [46] A false analogy occurs when claims are supported by
[8] [9] Nevertheless, the difference between the naturalistic fallacy and the fact–value distinction is derived from the manner in which modern social science has used the fact–value distinction, and not the strict naturalistic fallacy to articulate new fields of study and create academic disciplines.
The main problem with naturalism in ethics is its tendency to identify value with natural properties, like pleasure in hedonism or being more evolved in "Evolutionistic Ethics". [12] He accuses such positions of committing the naturalistic fallacy in trying to define the term "good", an unanalyzable term according to Moore, in terms of natural ...
The is-ought problem and the naturalistic fallacy: According to David Hume, it is hard to see how moral propositions featuring the relation ought could ever be deduced from ordinary is propositions, such as "the being of a God." [80] Divine command theory is thus guilty of deducing moral oughts from ordinary ises about God's commands. [81]
naturalistic fallacy: Mill is trying to deduce what people ought to do from what they in fact do; equivocation fallacy: Mill moves from the fact that (1) something is desirable, i.e. is capable of being desired, to the claim that (2) it is desirable, i.e. that it ought to be desired; and