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The instantiation relationship is a relation between objects and classes. We say that an object O, say Harry the eagle is an instance of a class, say Eagle. Harry the eagle has all the properties that we can attribute to an eagle, for example his parents were eagles, he is a bird, he is a meat eater and so on. It is a special kind of is a ...
Individuals (instances) are the basic, "ground level" components of an ontology. The individuals in an ontology may include concrete objects such as people, animals, tables, automobiles, molecules, and planets, as well as abstract individuals such as numbers and words (although there are differences of opinion as to whether numbers and words are classes or individuals).
Categorization is a type of cognition involving conceptual differentiation between characteristics of conscious experience, such as objects, events, or ideas.It involves the abstraction and differentiation of aspects of experience by sorting and distinguishing between groupings, through classification or typification [1] [2] on the basis of traits, features, similarities or other criteria that ...
The theory seeks to explain how it is possible for words to refer to classes of objects even if no such class has an objective existence. Dignāga's thesis is that classes do not refer to positive qualities that their members share in common. On the contrary, universal classes are exclusions . As such, the "cow" class, for example, is composed ...
Anthropocentrism is the privileging of humans as "subjects" over and against nonhuman beings as "objects". Philosophical anthropocentrism tends to limit certain attributes (e.g., mind, autonomy, moral agency, reason) to humans, while contrasting all other beings as variations of "object" (that is, things that obey deterministic laws, impulses, stimuli, instincts, and so on).
When people feel sympathy for inanimate objects, they are anthropomorphizing, attributing human behaviors or feelings to animals or objects who cannot feel the same emotions as we do, Shepard said.
The Categories do not provide knowledge of individual, particular objects. Any object, however, must have Categories as its characteristics if it is to be an object of experience. It is presupposed or assumed that anything that is a specific object must possess Categories as its properties because Categories are predicates of an object in general.
The young Socrates did not give up the Theory of Forms over the Third Man but took another tack, that the particulars do not exist as such. Whatever they are, they "mime" the Forms, appearing to be particulars. This is a clear dip into representationalism, that we cannot observe the objects as they are in themselves but only their ...