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Putnam's endorsement of Quine's version of the argument is disputed. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy states: "In his early work, Hilary Putnam accepted Quine's version of the indispensability argument." [108] Liggins and Bueno, however, argue that Putnam never endorsed the argument and only presented it as an argument from Quine. [109]
In Two Dogmas' revisited, Hilary Putnam argues that Quine is attacking two different notions. Analytic truth defined as a true statement derivable from a tautology by putting synonyms for synonyms is near Kant's account of analytic truth as a truth whose negation is a contradiction.
The explanatory indispensability argument is an altered form of the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument [3] first raised by W. V. Quine and Hilary Putnam in the 1960s and 1970s. [4] The Quine–Putnam indispensability argument supports the conclusion that mathematical objects exist with the idea that mathematics is indispensable to the ...
In the philosophy of mathematics, he and his Harvard colleague Hilary Putnam developed the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument, an argument for the reality of mathematical entities. [11] He was the main proponent of the view that philosophy is not conceptual analysis , but continuous with science; it is the abstract branch of the empirical ...
According to Putnam, Quine's version of the argument was an argument for the existence of abstract mathematical objects, while Putnam's own argument was simply for a realist interpretation of mathematics, which he believed could be provided by a "mathematics as modal logic" interpretation that need not imply the existence of abstract objects.
1 Quine–Putnam indispensability argument. Toggle the table of contents. Wikipedia: Peer review/Quine–Putnam indispensability argument/archive1. Add languages. Add ...
Beyond Quine's own concerns and potential discrepancies between epistemic and natural facts, Hilary Putnam argues that replacing traditional epistemology with naturalized epistemology would eliminate the normative. [5] But without the normative, there is no "justification, rational acceptability [nor] warranted assertibility".
It covers a range of topics in contemporary philosophy of mathematics including various forms of mathematical realism, the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument, mathematical fictionalism, mathematical explanation, the "unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics", paraconsistent mathematics, and the role of mathematical notation in the ...