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This image was created by Christopher X Jon Jensen and Greg Riestenberg archive copy at the Wayback Machine as part of the Evolutionary Games Infographic Project (EGIP). For more free game theory infographics plus a guide to using these images, please visit the EGIP Wikimedia Gallery or the EGIP main page .
The prisoner's dilemma is a game theory thought experiment involving two rational agents, each of whom can either cooperate for mutual benefit or betray their partner ("defect") for individual gain. The dilemma arises from the fact that while defecting is rational for each agent, cooperation yields a higher payoff for each.
The optional prisoner's dilemma (OPD) game models a situation of conflict involving two players in game theory. It can be seen as an extension of the standard prisoner's dilemma game, where players have the option to "reject the deal", that is, to abstain from playing the game. [ 1 ]
Merrill Meeks Flood (1908 – 1991 [1]) was an American mathematician, notable for developing, with Melvin Dresher, the basis of the game theoretical Prisoner's dilemma model of cooperation and conflict while being at RAND in 1950 (Albert W. Tucker gave the game its prison-sentence interpretation, and thus the name by which it is known today).
Tit-for-tat has been very successfully used as a strategy for the iterated prisoner's dilemma. The strategy was first introduced by Anatol Rapoport in Robert Axelrod's two tournaments, [3] held around 1980. Notably, it was (on both occasions) both the simplest strategy and the most successful in direct competition.
Example 1: The straightforward single round prisoner's dilemma game. The classic prisoner's dilemma game payoffs gives a player a maximum payoff if they defect and their partner co-operates (this choice is known as temptation). If, however, the player co-operates and their partner defects, they get the worst possible result (the suckers payoff).
Melvin Dresher (born Dreszer; March 13, 1911 – June 4, 1992) was a Polish-born American mathematician, notable for developing, alongside Merrill Flood, the game theoretical model of cooperation and conflict known as the Prisoner's dilemma while at RAND in 1950 (Albert W. Tucker gave the game its prison-sentence interpretation, and thus the name by which it is known today).
In game theory, a non-cooperative game is a game in which there are no external rules or binding agreements that enforce the cooperation of the players. A non-cooperative game is typically used to model a competitive environment. This is stated in various accounts most prominent being John Nash's 1951 paper in the journal Annals of Mathematics. [1]