Search results
Results From The WOW.Com Content Network
The decision articulated a doctrine known as "Chevron deference". [2] Chevron deference consisted of a two-part test that was deferential to government agencies: first, whether Congress has spoken directly to the precise issue at question, and second, "whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute".
The court's 6-3 ruling on Friday overturned a 1984 decision colloquially known as Chevron that has instructed lower courts to defer to federal agencies when laws passed by Congress are not crystal ...
The Chevron decision essentially gave federal agencies the authority to issue rules to implement laws that weren't clear. And that deference to the executive branch has enabled presidential ...
The Supreme Court's decision last month to overturn a decades-old decision that gave regulators more leeway to set rules will harm innovation and threaten U.S. economic vitality, according to ...
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), is a case decided by the United States Supreme Court that addressed the issue of when Chevron deference should be applied. In an 8–1 majority decision, the Court determined that Chevron deference applies when Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force ...
Here is a look at the court's decision and the implications for government regulations going forward. What is the Chevron decision? Atlantic herring fishermen sued over federal rules requiring them to pay for independent observers to monitor their catch. The fishermen argued that the 1976 Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act ...
A two-part analysis was born from the Chevron decision (called the "Chevron two-step test") in which a reviewing court first determined whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress was clear, that was the end of the matter because the court and the agency must give effect to the unambiguously ...
David Doniger, a lawyer and longtime Natural Resources Defense Council official who argued the original Chevron case in 1984, said he feared that a ruling to overturn the doctrine could “free judges to be radical activists” who could “effectively rewrite our laws and block the protections they are supposed to provide."