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The book received a mixed-to-positive review from Loren Lomasky in Public Choice, [8] co-inventor of the theory of "expressive voting" that was a close competitor to Caplan's theory of rational irrationality. [9] Stuart Farrand wrote a critique of Caplan's book for Libertarian Papers. [10] Gene Callahan reviewed the book for The Independent ...
The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies, published in 2007, further develops the "rational irrationality" concept from Caplan's earlier academic writing. It draws heavily from the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy in making the argument that voters have systematically biased beliefs about many ...
The American Voter established a baseline for most of the scholarly debate that has followed in the decades since. Criticism has followed along several different lines. Some argue that Campbell and his colleagues set the bar too high, expecting voters to be far more sophisticated and rational than is reasonable.
In their new book, "The Rural Voter: The Politics of Place and the Disuniting of America," Colby College political scientists Nicholas F. Jacobs and Daniel M. Shea set out to describe what ...
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=The_Myth_of_the_Rational_Voter:_Why_Democracies_Choose_Bad_Policies&oldid=442512989"
Rational irrationality is not doublethink and does not state that the individual deliberately chooses to believe something he or she knows to be false. Rather, the theory is that when the costs of having erroneous beliefs are low, people relax their intellectual standards and allow themselves to be more easily influenced by fallacious reasoning, cognitive biases, and emotional appeals.
They voted for Donald Trump for president, but now they're losing government jobs. They wonder why Trump and Elon Musk aren't focusing on real waste and inflation.
The altruism theory of voting is a model of voter behavior which states that if citizens in a democracy have "social" preferences for the welfare of others, the extremely low probability of a single vote determining an election will be outweighed by the large cumulative benefits society will receive from the voter's preferred policy being enacted, such that it is rational for an “altruistic ...