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The Polish logician Alfred Tarski identified three features of an adequate characterization of entailment: (1) The logical consequence relation relies on the logical form of the sentences: (2) The relation is a priori, i.e., it can be determined with or without regard to empirical evidence (sense experience); and (3) The logical consequence ...
In philosophy and logic, the classical liar paradox or liar's paradox or antinomy of the liar is the statement of a liar that they are lying: for instance, declaring that "I am lying". If the liar is indeed lying, then the liar is telling the truth, which means the liar just lied.
In this essay, arguing against the position of Benjamin Constant, Des réactions politiques, Kant states that: [2]. Hence a lie defined merely as an intentionally untruthful declaration to another man does not require the additional condition that it must do harm to another, as jurists require in their definition (mendacium est falsiloquium in praeiudicium alterius).
but mapping these back to English sentences using "if" gives paradoxes. The first might be read "If John is in London then he is in England, and if he is in Paris then he is in France. Therefore, it is true that either (a) if John is in London then he is in France, or (b) if he is in Paris then he is in England."
Inferences are steps in logical reasoning, moving from premises to logical consequences; etymologically, the word infer means to "carry forward". Inference is theoretically traditionally divided into deduction and induction, a distinction that in Europe dates at least to Aristotle (300s BCE).
Definitional retreat – changing the meaning of a word when an objection is raised. [23] Often paired with moving the goalposts (see below), as when an argument is challenged using a common definition of a term in the argument, and the arguer presents a different definition of the term and thereby demands different evidence to debunk the argument.
A semantic value that plays the same role for logical consequence as the role played by truth in classical logic, so that, for the consequence to hold, a designated value must be assigned to the conclusion if it is assigned to the premises. [96] [97] [98] destructive dilemma
There are fewer English translations of the Liezi than other Taoist texts. The first were partial versions; Lionel Giles (1912) translated chapters 1–6 and 8, while Anton Forke (1912) covered chapter 7 ("Yang Zhu"). As mentioned above, A. C. Graham (1960, 1990) wrote a definitive scholarly translation.