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The term naturalistic fallacy is sometimes used to label the problematic inference of an ought from an is (the is–ought problem). [3] Michael Ridge relevantly elaborates that "[t]he intuitive idea is that evaluative conclusions require at least one evaluative premise—purely factual premises about the naturalistic features of things do not entail or even support evaluative conclusions."
Naturalistic fallacy (sometimes confused with appeal to nature) is the inverse of moralistic fallacy. Is–ought fallacy [107] – deduce a conclusion about what ought to be, on the basis of what is. Naturalistic fallacy fallacy [108] (anti-naturalistic fallacy) [109] – inferring an impossibility to infer any instance of ought from is from ...
A similar view is defended by G. E. Moore's open-question argument, intended to refute any identification of moral properties with natural properties, which is asserted by ethical naturalists, who do not deem the naturalistic fallacy a fallacy. The is–ought problem is closely related to the fact–value distinction in epistemology.
To the extent that arguers jettison the acknowledged limitations of JIF-generated data in evaluative judgments or leave behind Garfield's "supplement rather than replace" caveat, they commit anchoring fallacies. A naturalistic fallacy can occur, for example, in the case of sheer quantity metrics based on the premise "more is better" [43] or, in ...
Frankena argued that naturalistic fallacy is a complete misnomer because it is neither limited to naturalistic properties nor necessarily a fallacy. On the first word (naturalistic), he noted that Moore rejected defining good in non-natural as well as natural terms. [5] Frankena rejected the idea that the second word (fallacy) represented an ...
The fact–value distinction is closely related to the naturalistic fallacy, a topic debated in ethical and moral philosophy. G. E. Moore believed it essential to all ethical thinking. [7] However, contemporary philosophers like Philippa Foot have called into question the validity of such assumptions.
This would be an example of what he referred to as "the naturalistic fallacy." Moore claimed that goodness is " indefinable ", i.e., it cannot be defined in any other terms. This is the central claim of non-naturalism.
However, it could be seen as a variation of the very same naturalistic fallacy; the difference between them could be considered pragmatical, depending on the intentions of the person who uses it: naturalistic fallacy if the user wants to justify existing social practices with the argument that they are natural; moralistic fallacy if the user ...