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In Kantian philosophy, the thing-in-itself (German: Ding an sich) is the status of objects as they are, independent of representation and observation. The concept of the thing-in-itself was introduced by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, and over the following centuries was met with controversy among later philosophers. [1]
[206] That is, the only "thing" (which is really an activity) that is truly absolute is that which is entirely self-conditioned, and, according to Hegel, this only occurs when spirit takes itself up as its own object. The final section of his Philosophy of Spirit presents the three modes of such absolute knowing: art, religion, and philosophy.
All things stand in a relation to all other things — and by virtue of his stress on Dasein's ontological distinction, things may also stand in relation to Dasein. (Heidegger 1962, p. H.78) The argument for this claim draws heavily on Hegel's great work, the Phenomenology of Spirit. Essentially, Being in itself is one of Heidegger's main ...
After Schulze had seriously criticized the notion of a thing-in-itself, Johann Gottlieb Fichte produced a philosophy similar to Kant's, but without a thing-in-itself. Fichte asserted that our representations are the productions of the "transcendental ego", that is, the knowing subject. For him, there is no external thing-in-itself.
In his philosophy, Hegel ventured to describe quite a few cases of "unity of opposites", including the concepts of Finite and Infinite, Force and Matter, Identity and Difference, Positive and Negative, Form and Content, Chance and Necessity, Cause and effect, Freedom and Necessity, Subjectivity and Objectivity, Means and Ends, Subject and ...
[5] That is, the only "thing" (which is really an activity) that is truly absolute is that which is entirely self-conditioned, and according to Hegel, this only occurs when spirit takes itself up as its own object. In some respects, this view of Hegel was anticipated by Johann Gottlieb Fichte's theory of the absolute self. [6]
The apple itself is also "pure substance in which is supposed to provide some sort of 'unknown support' to the observable qualities of things" [vague] that the human mind perceives. [12] The foundational or support qualities are called primary essences which "in the case of physical substances, are the underlying physical causes of the object's ...
It is real ground that serves to firstly make the connection between holding office and these reasons, and secondly to bind the various reasons, i.e. diverse content, together. Hegel points out that "the door is wide open" to infinite determinations that are external to the thing itself (recall that real ground is external).