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Witness-indistinguishable proof: verifiers cannot know which witness is used for producing the proof. Zero-knowledge proof schemes can be constructed from various cryptographic primitives, such as hash-based cryptography, pairing-based cryptography, multi-party computation, or lattice-based cryptography.
Most non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs are based on mathematical constructs like elliptic curve cryptography or pairing-based cryptography, which allow for the creation of short and easily verifiable proofs of the truth of a statement. Unlike interactive zero-knowledge proofs, which require multiple rounds of interaction between the prover ...
Cryptography, or cryptology (from ... including information theory, ... cryptosystems include interactive proof systems, [66] (like zero-knowledge proofs) [67] and ...
Photo by Clint Adair on Unsplash The following post was written and/or published as a collaboration between Benzinga’s in-house sponsored content team and a financial partner of Benzinga. The ...
In cryptography, a zero-knowledge password proof (ZKPP) is a type of zero-knowledge proof that allows one party (the prover) to prove to another party (the verifier) that it knows a value of a password, without revealing anything other than the fact that it knows the password to the verifier.
In cryptography, the Fiat–Shamir heuristic is a technique for taking an interactive proof of knowledge and creating a digital signature based on it. This way, some fact (for example, knowledge of a certain secret number) can be publicly proven without revealing underlying information. The technique is due to Amos Fiat and Adi Shamir (1986). [1]
To do so, Nexus is betting on a species of cryptography called "zero-knowledge proofs," or zk-proofs, which allow one party to prove to another that a piece of data is true, without conveying the ...
The first mention of Alice and Bob in the context of cryptography was in Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman's 1978 article "A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems." [ 2 ] They wrote, "For our scenarios we suppose that A and B (also known as Alice and Bob) are two users of a public-key cryptosystem".