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An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a strategy (or set of strategies) that is impermeable when adopted by a population in adaptation to a specific environment, that is to say it cannot be displaced by an alternative strategy (or set of strategies) which may be novel or initially rare.
The strategy employed by individuals (or ESS) is thought to depend on fitness: the better the strategy is at supporting fitness, the more likely the strategy is to be used. [5] When it comes to an evolutionarily stable state, all of the strategies used within the population must have equal fitness. [ 7 ]
The evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is akin to the Nash equilibrium in classical game theory, but with mathematically extended criteria. Nash equilibrium is a game equilibrium where it is not rational for any player to deviate from their present strategy, provided that the others adhere to their strategies.
In 1973 Maynard Smith formalised a central concept in evolutionary game theory called the evolutionarily stable strategy, [7] based on a verbal argument by George R. Price. This area of research culminated in his 1982 book Evolution and the Theory of Games. The Hawk-Dove game is arguably his single most influential game theoretical model.
Within sociobiology, a social behavior is first explained as a sociobiological hypothesis by finding an evolutionarily stable strategy that matches the observed behavior. Stability of a strategy can be difficult to prove, but usually, it will predict gene frequencies.
Mathematical models describe how signalling can contribute to an evolutionarily stable strategy. Signals are given in contexts such as mate selection by females, which subjects the advertising males' signals to selective pressure. Signals thus evolve because they modify the behaviour of the receiver to benefit the signaller.
In game theory an evolutionarily stable set (ES set), sometimes referred to as evolutionary stable sets, is a set of strategies, which score equally against each other, each of which would be an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) were it not for the other members of the set. ES sets were first defined by Thomas (1985ab).
Hamilton's unbeatable strategy was refined by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price (1973) into their concept of the evolutionarily stable strategy, i.e. one which cannot be invaded by a mutant strategy. [5]