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Quine's and Putnam's arguments have also been influential outside philosophy of mathematics, inspiring indispensability arguments in other areas of philosophy. For example, David Lewis , who was a student of Quine, used an indispensability argument to argue for modal realism in his 1986 book On the Plurality of Worlds .
Putnam considers the argument in the two last sections as independent of the first four, and at the same time as Putnam criticizes Quine, he also emphasizes his historical importance as the first top rank philosopher to both reject the notion of apriority and sketch a methodology without it.
The Quine–Putnam indispensability argument supports the conclusion that mathematical objects exist with the idea that mathematics is indispensable to the best scientific theories. [5] It relies on the view, called confirmational holism , that scientific theories are confirmed as wholes, and that the confirmations of science extend to the ...
In the philosophy of mathematics, he and his Harvard colleague Hilary Putnam developed the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument, an argument for the reality of mathematical entities. [11] He was the main proponent of the view that philosophy is not conceptual analysis , but continuous with science; it is the abstract branch of the empirical ...
While Quine's rejection of the analytic–synthetic distinction is widely known, the precise argument for the rejection and its status is highly debated in contemporary philosophy. However, some (for example, Paul Boghossian ) [ 16 ] argue that Quine's rejection of the distinction is still widely accepted among philosophers, even if for poor ...
According to Putnam, Quine's version of the argument was an argument for the existence of abstract mathematical objects, while Putnam's own argument was simply for a realist interpretation of mathematics, which he believed could be provided by a "mathematics as modal logic" interpretation that need not imply the existence of abstract objects.
Beyond Quine's own concerns and potential discrepancies between epistemic and natural facts, Hilary Putnam argues that replacing traditional epistemology with naturalized epistemology would eliminate the normative. [5] But without the normative, there is no "justification, rational acceptability [nor] warranted assertibility".
A view close to Quine’s subclass/category description is called ‘’conceptual relativity’’. [9] To describe conceptual relativity, Putnam points out that while the pages of a book are regarded as part of book when they are attached, they are things-in-themselves if they are detached. My nose is only part of an object, my person.