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In this essay, arguing against the position of Benjamin Constant, Des réactions politiques, Kant states that: [2]. Hence a lie defined merely as an intentionally untruthful declaration to another man does not require the additional condition that it must do harm to another, as jurists require in their definition (mendacium est falsiloquium in praeiudicium alterius).
Kant summed up his thoughts on this topic in a short footnote that appeared in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, B141. He had been discussing the definition of judgment in general. Logicians had usually defined it as a relation between two concepts. Kant disagreed because, he claimed, only categorical judgments are so defined.
Translations of the entire book: Kant, Immanuel (1991). The Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-30372-9 – via Internet Archive.. Kant, Immanuel. The Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge University Press, 1996. ISBN 0-521-56673-8. Kant, Immanuel. The Metaphysics ...
In his combined works, Kant construed as a basis for the ethical law by the concept of duty. [4] Kant began his ethical theory by arguing that the only virtue that can be an unqualified good is a good will.
Kant begins from common-sense moral reason and shows by analysis the supreme moral law that must be its principle. He then argues that the supreme moral law in fact obligates us. The book is famously difficult, [citation needed] and it is partly because of this that Kant later, in 1788, decided to publish the Critique of Practical Reason.
Kant argues that the internal possibility of all things presupposes some existence: [1] Accordingly, there must be something whose nonexistence would cancel all internal possibility whatsoever. This is a necessary thing. [2] Kant then argues that this necessary thing must have all the characteristics commonly ascribed to God.
Kant did not initially plan to publish a separate critique of practical reason. He published the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason in May 1781 as a "critique of the entire faculty of reason in general" [1] [2] (viz., of both theoretical and practical reason) and a "propaedeutic" or preparation investigating "the faculty of reason in regard to all pure a priori cognition" [3] [4] to ...
Kant also explains that when reason goes beyond its own limits, it becomes dogmatic. For Kant, the limits of reason lie in the field of experience as, after all, all knowledge depends on experience. According to Kant, a dogmatic statement would be a statement that reason accepts as true even though it goes beyond the bounds of experience. [65]