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Truth conditions of a sentence do not necessarily reflect current reality. They are merely the conditions under which the statement would be true. [1] More formally, a truth condition makes for the truth of a sentence in an inductive definition of truth (for details, see the semantic theory of truth).
Truth-conditional semantics is an approach to semantics of natural language that sees meaning (or at least the meaning of assertions) as being the same as, or reducible to, their truth conditions. This approach to semantics is principally associated with Donald Davidson , and attempts to carry out for the semantics of natural language what ...
A contemporary semantic definition of truth would define truth for the atomic sentences as follows: An atomic sentence F ( x 1 ,..., x n ) is true (relative to an assignment of values to the variables x 1 , ..., x n )) if the corresponding values of variables bear the relation expressed by the predicate F .
Ground truth is information that is known to be real or true, provided by direct observation and measurement (i.e. empirical evidence) as opposed to information provided by inference. Etymology [ edit ]
First-hand observation determines the truth or falsity of a given statement. Naïve Realism is an insufficient criterion of truth. A host of natural phenomena are demonstrably true, but not observable by the unaided sense. For example, Naïve Realism would deny the existence of sounds beyond the range of human hearing and the existence of x ...
Corresponding to the distinction between actual conditions and ideal conditions there is a distinction between actual consensus and ideal consensus. A theory of truth founded on a notion of actual consensus is a very different thing from a theory of truth founded on a notion of ideal consensus.
Tarski's material adequacy condition, or Convention T, is: a definition of truth for an object language implies all instances of the sentential form (T) S is true if and only if P. where S is replaced by a name of a sentence (in the object language) and P is replaced by a translation of that sentence in the metalanguage.
By using the schema one can give an inductive definition for the truth of compound sentences. Atomic sentences are assigned truth values disquotationally.For example, the sentence "'Snow is white' is true" becomes materially equivalent with the sentence "snow is white", i.e. 'snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white.