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The principal–agent problem typically arises where the two parties have different interests and asymmetric information (the agent having more information), such that the principal cannot directly ensure that the agent is always acting in the principal's best interest, particularly when activities that are useful to the principal are costly to ...
The relationship between a company's shareholder and the board of directors is generally considered to be a classic example of a principal–agent problem.The problem arises because there is a division between the ownership and control of the company, [10] as a result of the residual loss.
The multiple principal problem, also known as the common agency problem, the multiple accountabilities problem, or the problem of serving two masters, is an extension of the principal-agent problem that explains problems that can occur when one person or entity acts on behalf of multiple other persons or entities. [1]
One example is a principal–agent approach (also called agency theory), where one party, called an agent, acts on behalf of another party, called the principal. However, a principal–agent problem can occur when there is a conflict of interest between the agent and principal. If the agent has more information about his or her actions or ...
In this case, the agent's type is his or her health status, which is privately known by the agent. Another prominent example is public procurement contracting: The government agency (the principal) does not know the private firm's cost. In this case, the private firm is the agent and the agent's type is the cost level. [17]
For example, he has knowledge over his effort costs or his willingness-to-pay. Alternatively, models with interdependent or common values occur when the agent's type has a direct influence on the principal's preferences. For instance, the agent may be a seller who privately knows the quality of a car.
Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast first defined the theory of bureaucratic drift in 1987. [1] They argued that drift is essentially a principal-agent problem that explores "how—or indeed, whether—elected political officials can reasonably effectively assure that their policy intentions will be carried out."
Residual claimancy is generally required in order for there to be a moral hazard, which is a problem typical of information asymmetry. This is specifically the case for the principal–agent problem. [5] [6]