Search results
Results From The WOW.Com Content Network
A stable matching always exists, and the algorithmic problem solved by the Gale–Shapley algorithm is to find one. [3] The stable matching problem has also been called the stable marriage problem, using a metaphor of marriage between men and women, and many sources describe the Gale–Shapley algorithm in terms of marriage proposals. However ...
With this condition, a stable matching will still exist, and can still be found by the Gale–Shapley algorithm. For this kind of stable matching problem, the rural hospitals theorem states that: The set of assigned doctors, and the number of filled positions in each hospital, are the same in all stable matchings.
The algorithm will determine, for any instance of the problem, whether a stable matching exists, and if so, will find such a matching. Irving's algorithm has O( n 2 ) complexity , provided suitable data structures are used to implement the necessary manipulation of the preference lists and identification of rotations.
2. A matching is called super-stable if there is no couple each of whom either strictly prefers the other to his/her partner or is indifferent between them. Robert W. Irving [1] has modified the above algorithm to check whether such super stable matching exists and outputs matching in () time if it exists. Below is the pseudocode.
It also has a unique smallest element, the integer stable matching found by a version of the Gale–Shapley algorithm in which the hospitals make the proposals. [ 3 ] Consistently with this partial order, one can define the meet of two fractional matchings to be a fractional matching that is as low as possible in the partial order while ...
The lattice of stable matchings is based on the following weaker structure, a partially ordered set whose elements are the stable matchings. Define a comparison operation on the stable matchings, where if and only if all doctors prefer matching to matching : either they have the same assigned hospital in both matchings, or they are assigned a better hospital in than they are in .
In economics, stable matching theory or simply matching theory, is the study of matching markets. Matching markets are distinguished from Walrasian markets in the focus of who matches with whom. Matching theory typically examines matching in the absence of search frictions, differentiating it from search and matching theory .
Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis is a book on matching markets in economics and game theory, particularly concentrating on the stable marriage problem. It was written by Alvin E. Roth and Marilda Sotomayor , with a preface by Robert Aumann , [ 1 ] [ 2 ] and published in 1990 by the Cambridge University Press ...