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Some philosophers entirely reject any notion of localization of function and thus believe fMRI studies to be profoundly misguided. [15] These philosophers maintain that brain processing acts holistically, that large sections of the brain are involved in processing most cognitive tasks (see holism in neurology and the modularity section below).
In the philosophy of mind, Leibniz's gap is the problem that thoughts cannot be observed or perceived solely by examining brain properties, events, and processes. Here the word "gap" is a metaphor of a subquestion regarding the mind–body problem that allegedly must be answered in order to reach a more profound understanding of qualia, consciousness and emergence.
Paul Richard Thagard FRSC (/ ˈ θ eɪ ɡ ɑːr d /; born 1950) is a Canadian philosopher who specializes in cognitive science, philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of science and medicine. Thagard is a professor emeritus of philosophy at the University of Waterloo. He is a writer, and has contributed to research in analogy and creativity ...
The "theory of mind" is described as a theory because the behavior of the other person, such as their statements and expressions, is the only thing being directly observed; no one has direct access to the mind of another, and the existence and nature of the mind must be inferred. [11]
The philosophy of mind is a branch of philosophy that deals with the nature of the mind and its relation to the body and the external world. The mind–body problem is a paradigmatic issue in philosophy of mind, although a number of other issues are addressed, such as the hard problem of consciousness and the nature of particular mental states.
In the philosophy of mind, functionalism is the thesis that each and every mental state (for example, the state of having a belief, of having a desire, or of being in pain) is constituted solely by its functional role, which means its causal relation to other mental states, sensory inputs, and behavioral outputs. [1]
It was first proposed by the philosopher John Searle in 1980 and is defined by two main theses: 1) all mental phenomena, ranging from pains, tickles, and itches to the most abstruse thoughts, are caused by lower-level neurobiological processes in the brain; and 2) mental phenomena are higher-level features of the brain.
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