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The Schlieffen Plan (German: Schlieffen-Plan, pronounced [ʃliːfən plaːn]) is a name given after the First World War to German war plans, due to the influence of Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen and his thinking on an invasion of France and Belgium, which began on 4 August 1914.
In 1905, however, Schlieffen developed what was truly his first plan for a strategic offensive operation – the Schlieffen plan Denkschrift (Schlieffen plan memorandum). This plan was based on the hypothesis of an isolated Franco-German war which would not involve Russia and called for Germany to attack France.
On 3 August 1914, Germany responded to this action by declaring war on France. [16] Germany, facing a two-front war, enacted what was known as the Schlieffen Plan, which involved German armed forces moving through Belgium and swinging south into France and towards the French capital of Paris. This plan was hoped to quickly gain victory against ...
Germany's Schlieffen Plan was the most elaborate; the German Army was so confident that it would succeed that they made no alternative plans. It was kept secret from Austria, as well as from the German Navy , the chancellor and the foreign ministry, so there was no coordination–and in the end the plan failed. [ 6 ]
The Schlieffen Plan was scuttled when the shaken Moltke ordered the German right wing in France to retire during the First Battle of the Marne. [42] Soon Moltke was replaced by Erich von Falkenhayn who was already the Prussian war minister. After failing to dislodge the Entente in Flanders, he put the Western Front on the defensive.
Germany's main invasion thrust was towards Luxembourg City. On 1 August 1914, Germany declared war on Russia. On the outbreak of war with its eastern neighbour, Germany put the Schlieffen Plan into action, and Luxembourg's government's fears were realised. Initially, Luxembourg was only a transit point for Albrecht von Württemberg's Fourth Army.
The Schlieffen plan [sic] amounts to a critique of German strategy in 1914 since it clearly predicted the failure of Moltke’s underpowered invasion of France. Moltke followed the trajectory of the Schlieffen plan, but only up to the point where it was painfully obvious that he would have needed the army of the Schlieffen plan to proceed any ...
He has advanced the controversial thesis that the Schlieffen Plan as generally understood was a post-World War I fabrication. [1] [2] He first described his views about the Schlieffen Plan in a 1999 article in War in History, and further developed them in his 2002 book Inventing the Schlieffen Plan.