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Otherwise, the other voters use a classic voting rule, for example the Borda count. This game form is clearly dictatorial, because voter 1 can impose the result. However, it is not strategyproof: the other voters face the same issue of strategic voting as in the usual Borda count. Thus, Gibbard's theorem is an implication and not an equivalence.
Gibbard's proof of the theorem is more general and covers processes of collective decision that may not be ordinal, such as cardinal voting. [note 1] Gibbard's 1978 theorem and Hylland's theorem are even more general and extend these results to non-deterministic processes, where the outcome may depend partly on chance; the Duggan–Schwartz ...
On a rated ballot, the voter may rate each choice independently. An approval voting ballot does not require ranking or exclusivity. Rated, evaluative, [1] [2] graded, [1] or cardinal voting rules are a class of voting methods that allow voters to state how strongly they support a candidate, [3] by giving each one a grade on a separate scale.
Strategic or tactical voting is voting in consideration of possible ballots cast by other voters in order to maximize one's satisfaction with the election's results. [1] Gibbard's theorem shows that no voting system has a single "always-best" strategy, i.e. one that always maximizes a voter's satisfaction with the result, regardless of other ...
This rule means that an absolute majority (more than 50%) of voters judge that a candidate deserves at least its majority grade, and that half or more (50% or more) of the electors judges that he deserves at the most its majority grade. Thus, the majority grade looks like a median. If only one candidate has the highest median score, they are ...
The revelation principle shows that, while Gibbard's theorem proves it is impossible to design a system that will always be fully invulnerable to strategy (if we do not know how players will behave), it is possible to design a system that encourages honesty given a solution concept (if the corresponding equilibrium is unique). [3] [4]
Some voting rules are difficult to explain to voters in a way they can intuitively understand, which may undermine public trust in elections. [8] [failed verification] For example, while Schulze's rule performs well by many of the criteria above, it requires an involved explanation of beatpaths. Ease of voting.
Pages in category "Voting theory" The following 91 pages are in this category, out of 91 total. ... Gibbard's theorem; I. Impartial culture; Independent voter;